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Contesting a Pandemic:  
The WHO and the Council of Europe  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Contemporary risks are often understood as fundamentally uncertain.  This uncertain status can be 
mobilized within political debates surrounding risks. Such a challenge serves to destablise scientific claims. 
The World Health Organisation’s (WHO) management of the 2009/10 spread of the H1N1 virus became a 
site of one such contestation.   Debate within the Council of Europe particularly served to criticize the 
action of the WHO.  This resulted in a definitional and policy contestation between the two institutions. 
The WHO accounted for its actions through allusions to (seemingly stable) scientific facts, using 
epidemiological evidence of influenza and its management based on normal science.  In contrast, in 
criticising public expenditure and panic, the Council of Europe critics problematised the stability of the 
science employed by the WHO. This included fundamental aspects of scientific knowledge such as the 
measurability of morbidity and mortality caused by H1N1 and the effect of vaccination against influenza 
viruses. This criticism relied upon the ability to destabilise the WHO’s scientific knowledge, a process made 
possible through understandings of the uncertain nature of the science of risk (post-normal science). The 
case study illustrates that potential for previous-established and seemingly stable scientific facts to 
become destablised and problematised during contestations of risk management. 
KEY WORDS: contestation, influenza, World Health Organization, Council of Europe, sociology  
 
 
Introduction 
The World Health Organisation’s declaration of the start of the 2009 H1N1/A Influenza Pandemic 
led to the implementation of national pandemic preparedness plans and alerted publics 
worldwide to the risk of pandemic. The labelling of H1N1 as a ‘pandemic’ was accompanied by 
public and media interest, and became of focus of policy and political concern. In addition, the 
declaration resulted in the change of day-to-day routines (for example, influenza awareness and 
hygiene campaigns in the workplace, or issues around biosecurity and air travel). As events 
unfolded, and the pandemic event was perceived by some publics and political actors as relatively 
mild in nature, the World Health Organisation’s characterisation of the risk posed by H1N1 
became contested. The WHO’s recommendation of mass vaccination – and the government 
spending that went into implementing this – became a particular point of contention. One of the 
prominent political actors to contest the WHO’s position was the Council of Europe. The ensuing 
debate surrounding the WHO’s actions served to highlight the problem of defining the risk posed 
by highly transmissible epidemic disease.   
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Having arisen at a period of heightened interest surrounding the potential for the next big 
pandemic (Lazzari and Stohr 2004; Webby and Webster 2003; Webster 1997), H1N1 represented 
an important test of the WHO’s newly implemented pandemic-management strategies.  The 
WHO’s announcement on 11th June 2009 that H1N1 was a pandemic event was the first official 
pandemic declaration in over 40 years (Cohen and Enserink 2009). This triggered a range of 
pandemic risk management policies at the global, national, and local levels (WHO 2009).  The role 
of the WHO is fundamental to the management of (potential) pandemic agents, and the WHO 
was a pivotal actor in forming the reaction to H1N1.  However, critically for the WHO, the H1N1 
Pandemic did not become the severe and widespread disease event that it had (from the WHO’s 
perspective) threatened to be.  Worldwide, by the WHO’s own account, H1N1 had produced only 
18,500 laboratory-confirmed deaths by the declaration of the Post-Pandemic Period (WHO 
10/08/10), rendering the event relatively mild in comparison with previous experiences of 
pandemic influenza (Cox and Subbarao 2000; Nguyen-Van-Tam and Hampson 2003; 
Taubenberger and Morens 2006).   
 
The WHO had officially declared H1N1 to constitute a pandemic, and this declaration had 
precipitated the worldwide implementation of pandemic management strategies, the WHO was 
subsequently held liable for the consequences.  In particular, some national governments decried 
the widespread expenditure of public monies and resources on planning for a pandemic event 
that proved to be mild in impact.  First and foremost amongst these critics was the 
intergovernmental organization of the Council of Europe, which, following a series of discussions 
and debates, concluded that the WHO’s actions had caused both undue panic and excessive 
expense (Council of Europe 2010).  In making these claims, the Council of Europe mobilised its 
own narrative of the science of H1N1 to contradict the WHO’s policy-making and actions.   
 
In understanding the varying positions of the World Health Organization and the Council of 
Europe actors the following questions arise: 
 What were the particular points of tension or difference between the WHO’s and the 
Council of Europe’s accounts of managing H1N1? 
 What different ways of knowing underpin these contrasting accounts of risk? 
 Can these competing accounts be indicative of different understandings of the 
relationship between scientific knowledge and the management of H1N1? 
 How can discussions of post-normal science, focusing on the intersection between 
knowledge and risk management policy, aid in explaining the contestation? 
 What is the relationship between post-normal science and the management of risk? 
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The paper outlines the Council of Europe’s criticism of the role and actions of the WHO in 
managing H1N1, particularly in relation to the use of vaccines as a preventative strategy.  This 
primary conflict over management policies frames the deeper contestation over the science 
surrounding the event, including the identification of influenza as a distinct and measurable 
disease, and the specific nature of the H1N1 virus.  As the Council of Europe’s contestation 
focused upon the dispute of previously stable scientific knowledge (the nature of the influenza 
virus and the epidemiology surrounding these viruses). This highlights the fact that political 
challenges can serve to destabilise taken-for-granted scientific claims. 
 
 
Analytical perspectives  
 
The science surrounding risks can be conceptualised in a number of ways.. Traditional means of 
scientific discovery around risks take the form of ‘normal science’. Using Kuhn’s original 
definition, normal science refers to “research firmly based upon one or more past scientific 
achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time 
as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (Kuhn 1962:10).  Normal science is conducted 
by discipline-based communities of scientists, producing knowledge surrounding questions of 
their own construction. When the knowledge produced by normal science becomes transformed 
into stable and consistent sets of facts, having received scientific closure (Latour and Woolgar, 
1979), it can become packaged into the seemingly unproblematic black boxes of ‘ready-made 
science’ (Latour 1987: 4) to be unproblematically applied when considering new problems.   If 
institutions rely upon taken-for-granted risk management strategies (see the WHO and vaccines 
below), they are applying normal science in understanding the risk.  
 
Normal science was always incomplete. However, these problems were resolved by the scientists 
themselves, a Now, as risk analysis becomes a central t use of scientific knowledge,  the 
uncertainties of science have moved out of the esoteric circle of scientists and into the wider 
circle of risk management policy. Thus science has become overtly political and uncertainty now 
provides leverage to challenge science on its own grounds. In this context erstwhile taken for 
granted aspects of normal science (in this case the use of vaccinations for infectious disease 
control) become questioned and destabilized so that they lose their status as scientific objects. 
 
 
This form of science is strongly integrated/strongly contextualised science, where “knowledge 
production becomes part of a larger process in which discovery, application and use are closely 
integrated” (Gibbons et al. 2010:46). Strongly contextualised science is often applied where 
uncertainty is part of the research problem. This is because in such cases there is a need to 
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interact with non-scientists (e.g. policy-makers), and because human actions (e.g. in transmitting 
disease or undertaking social distancing strategies) form part of the problem (Nowotny et al. 
2001).  Under these conditions, the evidence that is produced is itself uncertain and often 
contradictory.  This is because the (necessarily) limited knowledge surrounding risks, and their 
fundamentally future orientation, produces diverse explanations of them.  Under such conditions 
black-boxed scientific artefacts (Latour 1987) can become problematized; the contents of normal 
science  become open to uncertainty and transdisciplinary reconstruction. 
 
While contrasting facts are often mobilised in response to political agendas, this is most clear 
where there is a high level of scientific uncertainty underpinning the policy issue. This is evident 
where there is contestation surrounding (for example) environmental (Carolan 2008; Saloranta 
2001) or health (Brown 2000) controversies (see also Guston 2001; Jasanoff 1987; Pohl 2008). 
Such contestation is particularly notable in response to risk management, where “the scientific 
side of the work must be complemented by other considerations, deriving also from its policy 
aspects” (De Marchi and Ravetz 1999: 743).  In such examples, there is a tendency for actors and 
institutions with a particular perspective or policy agenda to seek out experts who will reiterate 
the policy position (Carolan 2008; Freudenburg 2005). Institutions thus reinforce a favoured 
viewpoint through scientific means, associations with authority, and seeking out experts who will 
serve to legitimate the policy position, where “[i]n practice, the problem is resolved 
institutionally, but by the clients [here the risk managing institution] rather than the community 
of experts” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994: 1883).   
 
 
The contestation over H1N1 demonstrates the political malleability of scientific knowledge in the 
face of such risks. In particular, the concept of post-normal science is useful here, in referring to 
contemporary relationships between risk, politics and governance. Post-normal science is often 
used to denote a marked departure from the previous practices of normal science (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1993; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994; Jasanoff 2004a; Lenhard et al. 2006; Ravetz 2004), in that  
scientific knowledge is not taken as a self-determining form of inquiry, but rather, seen as 
moulded and produced in relation to societal/political goals (Nowotny 2003a). Post-normal 
science acknowledges that uncertainty is implicit in the study of risk or safety. This is due to the 
future-oriented and novel nature of risks, which means that science surrounding risks is often 
speculative. “The post-normal science (PNS) approach clearly shows that inevitably various sorts 
of uncertainty and value-commitments enter into any decision on risk” (De Marchi and Ravetz, 
1999:743).  This contrasts with normal models of science which sees science set apart from 
society as an autonomous rational authority, and where scientific knowledge it understood as 
cumulative in nature.  Implicit in the application of normal science to policy is the idea that 
uncertainty can be eliminated and/or controlled through the collection of definitive evidence. In 
contrast, uncertainty is understood as inherent in the post-normal form.   
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Normal and post-normal science are used here as analytical categories, referring to potential 
orientations to the problem of knowledge surrounding risks, rather than normative models of 
good science. This contrasts from the way the term post-normal science is utilised by some 
theorists (see: Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991), who argue a post-normal model is preferable where 
knowledge can be democratised. Rather, the idea of post-normal science aids in the explanation 
of one set of actors’ ability to deconstruct and fundamentally contest the knowledge claims 
surrounding the identification and management of risk. Many authors argue that post-normal 
science predominates within policy-making (Jasanoff 2004a; Jasanoff 2004c; Nowotny 1993, 
2000; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001; Ravetz 2004; von Schomberg 1993a).  It is particularly 
important in terms of policy production surrounding risks, where “the facts are inevitably 
uncertain, the values in dispute” (Ravetz 2003: 351) and the responsible institution must be 
concerned with “the management of a reality that has irreducible complexities and 
uncertainties” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994: 1882).   
 
 
Methods 
 
Qualitative textual analysis was used to provide an understanding of the WHO and Council of 
Europe’s representation of H1N1.  The WHO is responsible for the definition, declaration, and 
global management of pandemic events, as outlined by the 2005 International Health 
Regulations and the Pandemic Preparedness Guidance document (WHO 2008).  This paper is 
drawn from a wider study which examines the construction and management of the H1N1 
Pandemic within global health. In examining the WHO’s response, this included the collection 
and analysis of all publicly available documentation and statements produced by the WHO from 
the initial detection of the virus (March 2009) to the declaration of the ‘post-pandemic period’ 
(August 2010). This includes textual analysis of epidemiological statements (published daily, and 
then weekly, through the course of the pandemic), policy documents, and public statements 
(such as press statements made by WHO representatives).  
 
The Council of Europe was among the first and most vocal institutions to come out in criticism of 
the WHO’s response to H1N1. The contrasting narratives of the Council of Europe critics highlight 
contentious aspects of the WHO’s account and demonstrate the potential for alternate 
perspectives on the issue. Documents produced by the Parliamentary Assembly, and its 
subsidiary Committees, are analysed here. The documents range between December 2009 and 
June 2010, the period in which the Council of Europe investigated and debated the WHO’s 
handling of H1N1. This includes parliamentary motions, expert testimony at parliamentary 
committees, transcripts of parliamentary and committee debates, and reports and other 
documentation.  As with the WHO texts, the research included all publicly available texts that 
were produced within the period of study. The study focused upon the public representation of 
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H1N1 produced by the two institutions, and ways in which science was mobilised within these 
representations. 
 
The WHO and Council of Europe documents were reviewed through the use of qualitative textual 
analysis, focusing on keys themes and narratives occurring in these texts (Silverman 2004). The 
documents were treated as narrative texts, which allowed for the identification of ideological 
and discursive constructions (Dijk 2001; Lupton 1994). The analysis of texts is important in 
understanding representations of disease, as narrative texts employ language to both present 
and constitute cultural interpretations of reality. The analysis focused upon the institutional 
attempts to construct the threat of the H1N1 pandemic. Recurring narratives surrounding ideas 
of risk, knowledge and science were extracted from the texts, paying particular attention to the 
differences and tensions in the narratives produced by the two institutions.  
 
 
Background to the Institutional Conflict 
 
The H1N1 Pandemic was a particularly important event in the WHO’s recent institutional history.  
From the WHO’s perspective, its role is defined by the coordination of emergency and 
international events.  Historically, this role in vertical (and particularly infectious) disease 
management has been pivotal to the organization’s influence and prestige. Horizontal and 
chronic disease management strategies have been given secondary (and only more recent) 
attention (Beigbeder 1998; Corrigan 1979; Fidler 2001).  The management of events such as 
influenza pandemics is central to the WHO’s efforts within the contemporary climate of global 
public health.  As such, the contestation surrounding H1N1 spoke to the core of the WHO’s 
organizational goals and structure (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006; Fidler 2001). 
 
The WHO took a central role in the declaration and management of the H1N1 Pandemic.  This 
reflected the organization’s interests and perceived strengths, as well as its stated roles and 
responsibilities in relation to the revised International Health Regulations (2005).  For the WHO, 
the collection of epidemiological evidence surrounding H1N1 was vital to its organizational role 
within the contemporary structures of global health management.  This was facilitated through 
the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the surveillance network of 
institutions monitoring infectious disease events of potential international concern. Member 
countries are required to report to the WHO around any Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC), and the WHO acts as a central coordinator, communicator and repository of 
this scientific evidence.  During the H1N1 Pandemic, surveillance networks produced a vast 
amount of epidemiological data, which was fed through local and national governments to the 
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WHO. This epidemiological data (combined with virological data achieved from laboratory 
analysis of the H1N1 virus) underpinned the claims made by the WHO (and was later utilised in 
the contesting claims of the Council of Europe). 
 
The H1N1 Pandemic was seen as a key test of the WHO’s capabilities.  The WHO representatives 
reinforced the primacy of such campaigns as a part of the organization’s function: 
 
…this is our business really, and WHO mobilises to handle sudden emergencies.  We do 
this very often, whether this is Ebola (haemorrhagic fever) in Africa or the Tsunami spread 
over a very wide area.  Some countries fortunately can deal with a crisis once in a century.  
…[W]e [the WHO] deal with 250 events a year.  And that isn’t just reporting an event, that 
is responding to an event.  (Ryan [WHO Director of Global Alert and Response] 02/05/09) 
 
Such statements, along with others (for example: Fukuda [Special Advisor to the WHO Director-
General on Pandemic Influenza] 30/04/09; 04/05/09; 07/05/09), emphasised that the WHO saw the 
problem of H1N1 as fundamental to its role within global public health.  For this reason, the 
WHO’s actions were a potent site of political critique. 
 
The Council of Europe mounted the most prominent and first organizational and political voice 
of criticism against the WHO.  By late 2009/early 2010, the Council emphasized the mildness of 
H1N1 in criticizing the WHO’s management.  In doing so, the critics both used evidence produced 
or communicated by the WHO itself and, more fundamentally, problematized areas of scientific 
knowledge that had previously been taken-for-granted as fact.  
One of the loudest voices of criticism of the actions of the WHO came from the German 
epidemiologist/physician and Council of Europe parliamentarian Wolfgang Wodarg.  Wodarg was 
the first institutional critic of the WHO’s handling of H1N1, and emphasized what he described 
as the undue influence of pharmaceutical manufacturers upon the WHO’s actions.  His voice was 
prominent in the Council of Europe’s discussion of the events.  In addition, key expert witnesses 
(most notably, the epidemiologists Ulrich Keil and Tom Jefferson) were deployed by the Council 
of Europe to testify to the scientific evidence surrounding the case.  These experts were central 
to the Council of Europe’s account and were characteristic of the use of evidence surrounding 
H1N1. Within the post-normal model, experts maintain considerable authority and credibility 
(Nowotny 2003a, 2003b), but are also democratized in the sense that they must voice opinions 
on risks that are not necessarily areas of direct expertise (since risks, as described above, are 
interdisciplinary in nature). These experts must react to real-world and policy implications (Lynch 
2004; Shackley and Wynne 1996; von Schomberg 1993a), as has clearly occurred in the case of 
the Council of Europe experts.  As demonstrated below, the Council of Europe account heavily 
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relied on this form of expertise in contesting the WHO’s narrative of H1N1, and in constructing 
their own narrative of the events. 
 
The Council’s criticisms revolved around the wider critique of the WHO as an organization 
incapable of managing crisis situations.  This contrasted with the WHO’s own portrayal of its role, 
and dominant accounts of the WHO’s history (Bhattacharya 2008; Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006; 
WHO 2007), which emphasise the organization’s responsibility and function in dealing with 
emergency cases (e.g. HIV/AIDS, SARS, humanitarian disasters) and particularly infectious disease 
events (Beigbeder 1998; WHO 2007).  In decrying the WHO’s policy and actions surrounding 
H1N1, the critics within the Council of Europe emphasised the WHO’s lack of skill in these areas: 
 
The WHO was an excellent organization but it was notable that its long-term work was 
very good while its efforts to deal with emergencies were poor.  (Huss [representative for 
Luxembourg] in Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 24/06/10) 
 
Such critiques fed into the broader challenge of the WHO’s management, characterising the WHO 
as inadequate to the task of policy creation in response to acute emergencies. 
 
The Council of Europe’s criticisms of the WHO revolved around the WHO’s emphasis on vaccine 
use in its policy surrounding H1N1.  For the WHO, vaccines represented the greatest tool in 
combating the pandemic: 
 
Why are we so interested in vaccines against this new virus?  It is because we all know 
that vaccines are an extremely effective public health tool and in addition, vaccines 
against seasonal influenza are protective against the disease – in severe disease – of 
millions of people every year.  So, therefore, it is generally recognized and accepted 
that it would be critically important to have a vaccine if you want to stop the pandemic 
that might be coming with this virus. (Fukuda 01/05/09)   
The use of vaccines mirrored a historical tendency to favour vaccines as a purportedly effective 
preventative and defensive technique against infectious agents (Beigbeder 1998; Kitler, Gavinio, 
and Lavanchy 2002; Turnbull 1989). This was emphasised by the WHO as best practice in 
managing the pandemic.  Such statements were outlined throughout the WHO’s management of 
H1N1 (see for example: Kieny [Director of the Initiative for Vaccine Research] 24/09/09; Fukuda 
5/11/09; 03/12/09; 06/12/09), and the usefulness of vaccines was reiterated throughout the 
WHO’s pandemic policies.   
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This strategy became the focal point of the Council of Europe’s criticisms of the WHO.  While the 
WHO presented vaccine use as pivotal to the successful management of pandemic disease, the 
Council of Europe argued that the WHO’s recommendation of vaccines was a result of its capture 
by the interests of pharmaceutical corporations.  The WHO took for granted the utility of vaccines 
in managing infectious threats. The Council of Europe account served to destablise this 
assumption and tie the WHO’s mobilisation of the science to financial interests. This contestation 
surrounding vaccines was the political impetus underpinning the wider deconstruction of the 
WHO’s representation of H1N1.  For the Council of Europe: 
 
It seems that the exaggeration of the pandemic was perhaps neither a mistake nor a 
coincidence.  The pharmaceutical industries that earned a fortune from the pandemic had 
their people in the WHO, which had the power to declare the pandemic and thereby oblige a 
number of countries to buy large supplies of products from those industries. (Flynn [Council 
of Europe rapporteur on the issue] 23/03/10:4) 
  
The Council of Europe’s primary concern revolved around the use of pharmaceuticals.  Key 
members (and member states) of the Council were unsettled by the cost and panic associated 
with the WHO’s pandemic declaration and management actions.  The WHO was concerned with 
fostering relationships between diverse global health actors, including corporate actors, as is 
understood by the WHO’s role within the structures of contemporary global health (Brown, 
Cueto, and Fee 2006; Keane 1998; Taylor 2005).  Though the WHO argued that its strengths lay 
in its ability to facilitate cooperative action between a variety of global health actors (Brown, 
Cueto, and Fee 2006; Buse and Walt 2000; Fidler 2004), the Council of Europe alleged that the 
WHO was susceptible to influence by outside factors, particularly pharmaceutical corporations, 
who were cast not as cooperative partners but as vested interests. 
 
Vitally, the Council of Europe critics asserted that the WHO had manipulated scientific evidence 
in order to facilitate the use of vaccines against the H1N1 virus. The science surrounding vaccines 
was represented as malleable and it was suggested that the WHO mobilised interpretations of 
the science that relied upon political decisions (instead of the realities of the event). Rather than 
vaccine science highlighting the appropriate policy position (WHO’s account) the evidence itself 
was political and interpretable (Council of Europe’s account). This reflects the potential for the 
disruption of knowledge and evidence that occurs in the case of contemporary risk, as asserted 
by theories of post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994; Ravetz 2004). In this way, the 
critics suggested that the WHO had manufactured the risk: 
 
On the eve of the declaration of the pandemic, the WHO declared that the majority of cases 
were benign.  So the cases were benign, the virus was benign, and nevertheless on the 11th 
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of June the pandemic was declared, alert level 6.  What I wondered about when looking at 
these facts, is the unfolding of this all.  Even when we look at the WHO notifications we have 
a feeling that the WHO deliberately staged the events. (Rivasi 29/03/10) 
 
At the heart of this ‘staging’ was the idea that the WHO had mobilised epidemiological evidence 
in an unscientific manner, to amplify and exaggerate the risk posed by the H1N1 virus. 
 
Exactly a year ago, a very bad decision was taken by the World Health Organization that now 
seems unscientific and irrational.  The result of that decision was that the whole world 
became scared that a major plague was on its way – a new pandemic that would have been 
as bad, according to the reports, as the flu pandemic of 1918.  There seems to have been no 
scientific basis for that decision. (Flynn in Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
24/06/10) 
 
The WHO’s actions were thereby held by the Council of Europe critics to be fundamentally 
political.   
 
This deconstruction of the science employed by the World Health Organization was underpinned 
by the problematization of the use of vaccines against the H1N1 virus.  Jefferson, the 
epidemiologist who provided expert testimony as evidence in the Council of Europe’s 
investigation, suggested that: 
 
...it is clear that the performance of vaccines in healthy adults is nothing to get excited 
about.  On average, perhaps 1 adult out of a 100 vaccinated will get influenza symptoms 
compared to 2 out of 100 in the unvaccinated group.  ...However [in addition], our 
Cochrane review found no credible evidence that there is an effect against complications 
such as pneumonia or death. (Jefferson 29/03/10) 
 
In fact, it was alleged by the Council of Europe that pharmaceuticals against influenza as a general 
category of disease were not an efficaciou public health measure.  Again, Jefferson cited 
statistical evidence to support the assertion that such techniques are ineffectual: 
 
...vaccines and antivirals have a weak or non-existent evidence base against influenza.  
The quality of influenza vaccine studies is so bad that our systematic review of 274 vaccine 
studies which had [been] published between 1948 and 2007 found major discrepancies 
between data presented, the conclusion and the recommendation made by the authors 
of these studies. (Jefferson 29/03/10) 
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The science surrounding this public health technique was problematized in the Council of 
Europe’s account, propounded by scientific experts who contested claims surrounding the 
efficacy of vaccines.  This fed into, and was reinforced by, the problematization of the wider 
scientific knowledge surrounding H1N1.   
 
As the quotes above serve to demonstrate, criticism of the WHO’s mobilisation of evidence and 
knowledge was central to the Council of Europe’s contestation of the WHO’s management.  In 
criticising public expenditure and panic, the Council of Europe critics contested the WHO’s 
actions through a fundamental dismantling of the facts of H1N1 Pandemic. This included the 
specific nature of the H1N1 virus, and a contestation of the idea of influenza itself. The evidence 
was represented as a tool for political decisions, contradicting the WHO’s account of the widely-
understood utility of vaccines. 
 
Scientific evidence was used as a means through which the truth of H1N1 could be understood 
(Braun and Kropp 2010; Gieryn 1999), with the WHO and the Council of Europe each constructing 
different interpretations of the role of this evidence within this policy debate.  The World Health 
Organization made reference to the epidemiological evidence produced by the makers of normal 
science (Jasanoff 2004b; Ravetz 2004; von Schomberg 1993b), where disciplinary-bound sets of 
anonymous scientific actors worked to produce knowledge that is privileged as grounded in an 
autonomous rational authority.  However, given that the contemporary science of risks is 
uncertain, and open to challenge (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; Jasanoff 2004a; Nowotny, Scott, 
and Gibbons 2001), the WHO’s account became susceptible to investigation and interrogation.  
As such, the Council of Europe’s allusions to science suggests a more mutable and unstable form, 
where basic knowledge can be interrogated. The politics of scientific knowledge come to the fore. 
  
 
Contestation of Influenza as a Distinct Disease 
 
The Council of Europe’s contestation of the science surrounding H1N1 problematized the 
prevailing understanding of the nature of the influenza pandemic events.  Pivotal here was the 
representation of influenza as a diagnosable pathology.  That influenza is a distinct and 
measurable disease was taken for granted in the World Health Organization’s account. as Also 
assumed was the idea that pandemic influenza strains are epidemiologically measurable, and are 
likely to cause severe disease.  For the WHO, these orientations towards influenza counted as 
established scientific knowledge, as the normal science (Latour, 1987) which could be applied to 
the situation.  All of these assumptions were contested by the Council of Europe critics.  The 
critique of the WHO’s actions surrounding H1N1 were bound by a fundamental problematisation 
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of the science and evidence, underpinned by the difference in models of science employed by 
the two institutions. 
 
For the World Health Organization, the idea that pandemics are caused by novel influenza strains 
was a taken-for-granted reality.  Influenza was seen as a distinct disease, and influenza agents 
were known to cause pandemics: 
 
Influenza pandemics are caused by a virus that is either entirely new or not known to have 
circulated among humans in recent decades.  This means, in effect, that nearly everyone in 
the world is susceptible to infection.  It is this almost universal vulnerability that makes 
influenza pandemics so disruptive. (Chan [WHO Director-General] 04/05/10) 
 
It is clear that the World Health Organization understood novel influenza viruses, in this case 
H1N1, as the infectious agent behind pandemic events.  This was an affirmed reality which 
underpinned the WHO’s management decisions. 
 
In contrast, the Council of Europe critics problematized these fundamental scientific assumptions 
to contest that WHO’s actions.  For the critics, the term influenza was an ambiguous misnomer, 
and a subjective and ill-defined disease entity.  Here the Council critics argued that the WHO was 
tracking the more amorphous category of influenza, not the specific H1N1 virus.  The Council of 
Europe critics asserted that the category of influenza covered a wide range of illnesses, and that 
this should more accurately be termed ‘influenza-like illnesses’ (ILIs), comparable to the set of 
diseases the general public would refer to (incorrectly) as flu.  They argued that the WHO based 
its management decisions upon the purported presence and spread of H1N1 influenza, whereas 
in fact the WHO was monitoring only ILIs.  In this way, the Council of Europe critics suggested 
that it is impossible to manage influenza as though it was a distinct and measurable disease.  They 
asserted that the WHO purposefully conflated the influenza virus with the general category of 
ILIs in characterising the risk of pandemic.  As such: 
 
...the confusion between influenza and influenza-like illness (“the flu”) has led to an obsession 
with a single agent (the influenza virus) which is not based in any sound evidence and, as I 
hope you now realize, is potentially dangerous and misleading... (Jefferson 29/03/10) 
  
The primary source of this danger, as we will explore further below, was the use of vaccines 
against the threat.  Since pandemic influenza was, according to this account, indeterminable, the 
WHO’s choice of (strain-specified) vaccine as a management technique was scientifically 
discredited.  In this way, the primary presumptions which underpinned the WHO’s actions (that 
the disease being monitored was caused specifically by the H1N1 influenza virus, and that 
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influenza itself is a distinct disease) were undermined in the Council of Europe’s account of the 
event.  
 
Associated with the argument that influenza was not a distinct disease, was the assertion (made 
by the Council of Europe critics) that influenza cannot be scientifically measured.  The WHO’s 
actions against H1N1 rested upon the presumption that the spread and severity of the virus could 
be scientifically measured.  In respect to H1N1, surveillance and the collection of scientific 
information was emphasised by the WHO: 
 
…[an] area we are focusing pretty heavily on, is what is the science.  And when we are 
dealing with a new disease we can look at how things develop, we can describe what is 
going on, but we really want to understand why, because it is the “why” which is going to 
give us a handle on how do we manage this better, how do we treat it in a really scientific 
way, but science does not come overnight. (Ben Embarek [WHO Food Safety Scientist] 
04/05/09) 
 
In this way, the uncovering of (objective, definitive and reliable) scientific information (i.e. normal 
science) was seen as pivotal to the WHO’s management of H1N1.  In understanding the virus, the 
WHO hoped to be better able to react to the spread of pandemic disease.  In fact, at times, the 
WHO congratulated itself on the amount of epidemiological information that was collected by 
and through them. 
 
One of the interesting things about this whole situation is that the amount of information 
available on what is unfolding is really probably unprecedented.  There is more 
information available about the epidemiology, about the viruses, than has ever been … 
(Fukuda 14/05/09) 
   
The collection of epidemiological information surrounding the H1N1 virus, was presented by the 
WHO as being pivotal to effective action surrounding the disease.  It was understood that 
epidemiological information was obtainable, and that this would provide objective and concrete 
information through which to make decisions.   
 
For the Council of Europe critics, since it was (according to their account) impossible to distinguish 
the pandemic strain from other ILIs, it was equally impossible to measure specific influenza 
strains.  What is being measured, asserted the critics, was not even influenza as a general 
category, but rather all ILIs.  The WHO influenza surveillance mechanisms were therefore 
ineffectual: 
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Influenza surveillance programmes in different places appear to report on the presence 
and degree of threat of influenza but what they are really looking at are influenza-like 
illnesses/flu. 
 
[In fact] we cannot say for certain how much influenza is circulating, as influenza is an 
unknown portion of an unknowable whole (influenza-like illness/flu). (Jefferson 
29/03/10) 
 
In this way, the Council of Europe critics argued that the measurement of the specific H1N1 virus 
was impossible, and that the WHO had based its actions upon unscientific evidence. The notion 
of (good) science was therefore central to the claims of both the WHO (policy based upon the 
scientific knowledge achieved through global surveillance) and the Council of Europe (evidence 
as a tool of the WHO to make politically and economically expedient decisions). It is clear that 
the Council of Europe’s mobilisation of science reflects a more malleable form, where the 
fundamental facts of an influenza pandemic become open to interrogation, and science becomes 
politicised. The World Health Organization’s account, while acknowledging the underlying 
uncertainty of the pandemic, defers to observable evidence and pre-existing knowledge of 
influenza in explaining the actions they have taken; that is, the WHO is relying upon ready-made 
science. Both organizations utilised similar types of evidence (e.g. the epidemiological statistics 
produced through WHO surveillance, but mobilised these evidences into contrasting ways of 
knowing H1N1. The (same) data was employed with different logics. The WHO perceived clear 
scientific evidence as underpinning policy. The Council of Europe critics saw inaccurate scientific 
claims used to support political decisions.  
 
The potential to measure and survey influenza strains, a centrepiece of the WHO’s pandemic 
detection and management strategies, was problematic for the Council of Europe.  It was 
asserted that a truly objective and scientific understanding of specific influenza strains was 
impossible. 
 
…the currently available evidence does not allow us to know in a reliable way how many 
cases of influenza there are, nor its impact in terms of death and disability with any degree 
of certainty. (Jefferson 29/03/10) 
 
Here, the expert testimony of Jefferson helped to frame the evidence utilised by WHO as 
inaccurate and disingenuous.  Not only was the WHO constructing the risk posed by the H1N1 
Pandemic through the use of erroneous evidence, but the WHO could not but be aware of its 
(mis)use of epidemiological information in that manner.  In this way, the Council of Europe critics 
stated that the WHO inappropriately mobilised scientific data in a way that magnified the severity 
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of the H1N1 Influenza virus.  They argued that the statistics forwarded by the WHO were 
misleading.  For example: 
 
With regard to such an overstatement [of risk], the rapporteur would notably like to point 
out that, in many countries, no clear distinction had been made between patients dying 
with swine flu (i.e. showing symptoms of swine flu whilst having died of other pathologies) 
and patients dying of swine flu (i.e. swine flu being the main lethal cause). (Flynn 
23/03/10:3 [emphasis in original]) 
 
The critics asserted that the incidence of H1N1 was immeasurable, and that therefore, the WHO 
did not have an accurate basis for measuring the risk, rendering the WHO’s representations of 
the risk of pandemic flawed.   
 
This representation of the nature of influenza was pivotal to arguments around the use of 
vaccines.  In characterising influenza as an amorphous entity, the Council of Europe critics argued 
that (strain-specified) vaccines were an inefficacious management technique. This was because 
the vaccines: 
 
 …could only effect at the most (i.e. if they had 100% efficacy) some 7-15% of the annual 
flu burden, since this is the proportion of people with flu who truly have influenza.  …But, 
if you really think about it, it is a wonderful utopian policy against a syndrome as 
unspecific as this….In my opinion, the lack of logic in this thinking is stunning. (Jefferson 
29/03/10 [original emphasis]) 
 
This is linked in with the argument that influenza, and specific influenza variants, are impossible 
to measure: 
 
…vaccination programmes are directed against what surveillance systems worldwide call 
“influenza” but in reality are influenza-like illness/flu.  Surveillance systems cannot 
distinguish the two and provide reliable estimates of impact.  This point is key to 
understanding what comes next.  The false equation “influenza-like illness/flu = influenza” 
has misled some of the research on the effects of influenza vaccines and (most of all) the 
interpretation of such evidence. (Jefferson 29/03/10) 
 
These assertions built the argument that the threat posed by the H1N1 virus was exaggerated by 
the WHO in order for commercial actors to profit from the sale of vaccines.   
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The Council of Europe critics asserted that the WHO had incorrectly mobilised the scientific 
evidence surrounding H1N1.  This was due to a deeper problem within these facts.  Specifically, 
the critics asserted that the influenza virus is indistinguishable from other respiratory agents 
(ILIs).  This meant that the monitoring of the specific influenza A/H1N1 strain was impossible, and 
that the WHO data was therefore inappropriately used to charaterise the risk posed by the 
pandemic.  Here, the fundamental scientific knowledge surrounding pandemic influenza came 
under contestation – the reality of influenza as a distinct disease, the ability to distinguish specific 
influenza strains, and the ability to monitor and measure influenza.  In contesting the WHO’s 
management of H1N1, the Council of Europe went beyond the critique of public health decisions 
into the contestation of the underlying facts surrounding pandemic events.  While the WHO 
alluded to (previously stable) scientific knowledge in its decision-making surrounding H1N1, the 
Council of Europe account viewed these same facts as interpretable pieces of evidence mobilised 
within political structures. The Council of Europe critics reconstructed the same pieces of 
evidence to show why their critical interpretation of the WHO’s actions was a similarly valid 
interpretation of the event. 
 
The representation of scientific knowledge was key to the events surrounding H1N1, as scientific 
facts were employed as rhetorical devices, and evidence in support of particular policy positions, 
by both the WHO and the Council of Europe.  What is particularly notable was the Council of 
Europe’s questioning of underlying knowledge and the existence and measurement of the 
disease.  The attempted scientific closure (Latour and Woolgar 1979) surrounding the concept of 
pandemic influenza was disrupted by the Council of Europe.  Furthermore, it was not the 
scientifically uncertain aspects of the pandemic (e.g. the likely spread of the virus, the likely 
termination of the pandemic threat) that were under contestation, but the more scientifically 
well-evidenced positions (the fact of influenza and its measurability Ready-made scientific 
artefacts (Latour 1987) became problematized through their contestation/opening; the contents 
of normal and fixed science became open to uncertainty and transdisciplinary reconstruction by 
the experts of the Council of Europe. 
 
 
H1N1 as a Pandemic-Causing Agent 
 
In addition to contesting the fundamental understanding of influenza, the Council of Europe 
critics contested the WHO’s interpretation of the science surrounding the specific strain of H1N1.  
The criticism centred upon the assertion that the World Health Organization had misused 
scientific evidence in its public statements and policy surrounding H1N1.  Flynn suggests that: 
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When looking at the still very moderate expression of the pandemic almost one year after its 
outbreak (May 2010), the interpretation of scientific and empirical evidence can be seriously 
questioned.  For some experts, it seemed obvious from a relatively early stage that the new 
sub-type of influenza virus was doing less harm to persons infected than other forms in 
previous years. (Flynn 07/06/10:8) 
 
In this way, the Council of Europe critics problematized the WHO’s stance towards the H1N1 
virus, and in particular, the Organization’s interpretation and communication of evidence 
surrounding the viral strain.  The Council of Europe criticised all aspects of the WHO’s 
interpretation of H1N1, including the idea of the H1N1 virus as a pandemic-causing agent, the 
level of risk posed by H1N1, and the novelty of the viral strain.   
 
The Council of Europe critics contested the WHO’s explanation of scientific evidence on a number 
of counts.  Firstly, the WHO argued that the H1N1 virus represented an important threat because 
of the swift spread of the virus.  The WHO asserted that this spread was an important 
characteristic of the risk of H1N1, since “…the H1N1 virus spread very easily from person to 
person, spread rapidly within a country once it establishes itself, and is rapidly spreading to new 
countries” (Chan, 11/06/09).  In contrast, the Council of Europe argued that this rapid spread was 
an innate characteristic of influenza (and other ILIs), and was in no way indicative of increased 
risk: 
 
Given the fact that the influenza virus is always a very contagious disease which spreads 
very rapidly and leads to a greater number of cases, it is surprising to see the extent to 
which attention was focussed on that flu [H1N1] after the reporting of only hundreds of 
cases. (Wodarg 26/11/10) 
 
Here, Wodarg argues that the WHO characterised H1N1 as a high risk far before any conclusive 
scientific evidence was available through which to make that judgement.  Further, influenza is 
characterised as innately a disease of rapid spread. This spread is not necessarily highly risky or 
notable. 
 
The WHO also referred to the viral novelty in representing the risk posed by H1N1.  The WHO 
argued that H1N1 represented a significant threat due to the fact that the virus was entirely new, 
and therefore that human immune systems had not been exposed to it before. 
 
Influenza pandemics are caused by a virus that is either entirely new or not known to have 
circulated among humans in recent decades.  This means, in effect, that nearly everyone 
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in the world is susceptible to infection.  It is this almost universal vulnerability to infection 
that makes influenza pandemic so disruptive.  (Chan 04/05/09) 
 
Here, and in other instances (see: Chan 29/04/09, Fukuda 26/05/09), the WHO emphasises the 
novelty of the H1N1 as a pandemic threat.  However, in contrast, the Council of Europe’s account 
challenges these arguments of novelty.  For the Council of Europe, H1N1 was a known virus of 
little relevance. 
 
…the WHO declared…that this was an entirely new virus.  Now what here we see on the 
22nd of May in 2009, we see that 10% of the under-60s and 30% of the over-60 age bracket 
already have an immunity against this virus.  So we say “well, why stage things in this way, 
why manipulate things in this way?” when the virus is used this way. (Rivasi 29/03/10) 
 
Again, the Council of Europe critics dispute the WHO’s account of the science surrounding H1N1, 
and in doing so, imply that the WHO has manufactured the threat for political purposes.  The 
Council of Europe argued that H1N1 was not a novel virus, and therefore did not have the unique 
capacity to cause a pandemic – undermining the WHO’s reading of the scientific evidence. 
 
The WHO claimed that in its use of the scientific evidence, and its communication of the threat 
posed by H1N1, it had been objective and moderate in its decision-making.  The WHO suggested 
that pandemics are extremely tempestuous events, which are difficult to predict and account for 
(see Chan 04/05/09; 15/05/09; 11/06/09; Fukuda 26/04/09 for some notable instances).  While 
uncertainty was accounted for in the WHO’s claims, this uncertainty (and therefore risk) was 
thought to be manageable through the collection of further epidemiological evidence. In 
contrast, the Council of Europe disputed the WHO’s management of the pandemic.  They argued 
that the WHO had miscommunicated the evidence surrounding H1N1 to magnify the sense of 
threat and need for action.  
 
In the statement made at the very beginning of 2010, WHO insisted that the world was 
facing a real pandemic, the future course of the pandemic was uncertain, that situation 
was neither overplayed nor underplayed, and the objective had always been a 
precautionary approach.  In the same statements, WHO claimed that it was too early to 
say whether the pandemic was over and that another significant wave could still be 
expected… (Flynn 23/02/10:6)  
 
While the WHO emphasised the inherent uncertainty of the situation, the Council of Europe 
criticisms mobilised scientific evidence in a contrary manner, one which highlighted the flaws in 
the WHO’s management style and strategy and spoke to more data which was open to (multiple) 
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interpretation(s).  The uncertain nature of the situation highlighted for the Council of Europe the 
political underpinnings of the WHO’s role.  
 
In addition to contesting the fundamental science surrounding the nature of influenza, then, the 
Council of Europe also contested the WHO’s specific use of the epidemiological evidence 
surrounding H1N1.  The Council of Europe argued that the WHO had magnified the threat 
presented by the H1N1 virus, and misled governments and publics in respect to the disease.  This 
mis-definition of H1N1, according the Council of Europe, allowed for the widespread use of 
vaccines as a pandemic management strategy (which was the issue at the heart of the debate).   
  
The management of pandemic threats is central to the World Health Organization’s role within 
global health. The contestation surrounding the management of H1N1 was therefore highly 
problematic for the WHO. Following criticisms made by the Council of Europe and other actors, 
the WHO investigated its handling of the event, including specific references to the claims made 
by critics. While the WHO found no evidence of claims of capture by pharmaceutical 
corporations, aspects of the Organisation’s communication of risk were found to be problematic. 
This included problematizing the Organization’s methods of gathering scientific information 
surrounding pandemic threats. Tellingly, the investigation found that frequent requests for data 
from affected countries was counter-productive in terms of useful information in managing the 
disease. Also found lacking were clear definitions of the category of pandemic and ways in which 
to measure severity of disease (WHO, 2011). The continued calls for further epidemiological facts 
that had occurred during the pandemic is particularly indicative of the WHO’s orientation 
towards this risk; it was thought that further evidence would underpin good policy decisions. 
While uncertainty was fundamental to the threat, the WHO sought a stable frame of scientific 
evidence.    
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined the way in which the contesting actors of the World Health Organisation 
and the Council of Europe represented the risk posed byf H1N1. The WHO based its actions on 
epidemiological evidence and pre-established scientific facts in managing the virus and 
preventing its impacts. In contrast, the Council of Europe argued that the WHO misinterpreted 
the evidence surrounding H1N1, and mismanaged the event in emphasising the use of vaccines 
as a management strategy.  Through the use of expert testimony, the Council of Europe asserted 
their own interpretation of the science surrounding the H1N1 pandemic, and highlighted the 
instability of some of the WHO’s account of the disease. 
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The Council of Europe problematized fundamental assumptions made by the WHO, such as the 
nature of H1N1 and the definition and monitoring of influenza.  In this way, the fluidity 
surrounding (appropriate ways to interpret) scientific evidence was highlighted (Gibbons, et al, 
2010). Post-normal was of understanding towards science – including the attendant 
destabilisation of evidence and linking of science with policy – was apparent in analysing the 
critics’ accounts (Nowotony, 2001). In re-formulating and contesting the idea of ‘influenza’ as a 
disease, the Council of Europe critics argued that the WHO was unable to track the specific 
influenza agent of H1N1, and was therefore exaggerating the morbidity and mortality figures.  In 
problematizing the concept of H1N1 as a severe and risky viral strain, the WHO’s strategy of 
vaccine use was criticised.  This case study, then, highlights the mutability of scientific knowledge 
within cases of policy contestation around risk, and the particular form of partial and contestable 
knowledge that surrounds politically-charged risk management (Nowotny 1993; Nowotny et al. 
2001).  Institutional decision-making, and institutionally-based orientations to the risk in 
question, are fundamental to the treatment of both the risk and the science surrounding it. 
 
The WHO took the outputs of epidemiological investigation, combined with existing ready-made 
science, as tools through which to base policy decisions.  In contrast, reacting to the distress 
caused by mass public expenditure and panic, the Council of Europe actors mobilised 
interdisciplinary experts to contest the WHO’s claims, representing the science as far more 
malleable, inherently political and fundamentally constructed (Nowotony, 2003a).  This 
demonstrates the way in which post-normal accounts of risk – in highlighting the fragility of 
evidence surrounding these threats – can explain the contestation of risk policy.  Here, previously 
ready-made science – e.g. the use of vaccines as a tool to manage the spread of influenza - is 
problematized and transformed into a site of scientific instability. Scientific knowledge becomes 
destabilised during contestations between institutions with different political positions on risk 
management. 
 
This case study shows that the WHO and the Council of Europe engaged in policy contestation 
through competing interpretations of scientific evidence. These divergent positions framed the 
two organisations’ ways of knowing and reacting to the spread of H1N1. The WHO was concerned 
with the collection of comprehensive epidemiological evidence, and related this evidence to pre-
existing scientific facts to underpin policy decisions. In contrast, the Council of Europe critics 
perceived (often the same) evidence as inherently unstable, and based on inaccurate 
assumptions around the nature of influenza. Instead of merely criticising the policy decisions 
made by the WHO, the Council of Europe critics deconstructed previously taken-for-granted facts 
surrounding influenza, the concept of a pandemic, and the characteristics of the H1N1 virus.  The 
policy conflict was framed through highlighting the unstable nature of the science itself, a process 
made possible through post-normal orientations towards risk.  While much of the literature on 
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post-normal science tends to focus on emerging problems and technologies, this case shows that 
more seemingly stable scientific issues can become destabilised through political challenges to 
risk construction. 
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